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Introduction
Environmental protection is one of the most important issues on the agenda for policy-makers and governments across the globe. In particular, the debate has focused on which tool should be adopted to convince …rms to reduce the level of polluting emissions. The conventional instrument, a tax proportional to level of pollution, has been often criticized, on the ground that it is very di¢ cult to measure the exact damage produced by each …rm. Likewise, other alternative tools have been proposed, and policies have been suggested. In the European Union, the creation of a market for the exchange of polluting permits has been considered as an e¢ cient solution, but it relies on the fact that a certain level of pollution is not only accepted, but also supported.
Many commentators claim that educating citizens/consumers to respect the environment may prove to be a very e¤ective instrument, as it rewards green …rms to the detriment of brown …rms.
A recent example of informative policies in the EU includes the Italian guidelines on CO 2 emission savings. 1 The document ranks vehicles according to their environmental impact. In the US, a similar initiative, the EPA Smart Way program, compares environmental performance of vehicles. 2 The main question is therefore: how do consumers react to such initiatives? Are they really willing to switch to a green good, even if the pure satisfaction from its consumption is lower than that of a brown good? Electric cars, for example, still have not reached a level of performance comparable to that of traditional combustible vehicles. Depending on whether consumers value the intrinsic quality of the engine more than its environmental impact, such a policy may have a di¤erent impact on in ‡uencing consumers'choice. This is what we want to capture in our paper.
We adopt a model of vertical di¤erentiation where two …rms compete by setting prices. As usual, …rms di¤erentiate their products in quality as a way to mitigate competition and increase pro…ts (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982) . However, in our paper one of the two …rms produces the green good and pays an additional cost for it. The other produces a polluting good, and may be subject to environmental taxation.
Following our preliminary discussion, we consider two di¤erent scenarios, depending on whether consumers perceive the quality of the product as being dependant on the pure performance (hedonic quality) or on the emission of pollution (environmental quality). In the …rst case, the high quality good is the one that pollutes, while in the second case the opposite holds. This will have a signi…cant impact on the fundamental assumptions on which the theoretical model is based.
In each scenario, we build a two-stage game where the government intervenes in the …rst stage by either taxing the polluting …rm, or by indirectly rewarding the green …rm through an environmental campaign. In the second stage, …rms compete by setting prices. A crucial point of our model is that the campaign is designed in order to stigmatize pollution. In particular, its …nal aim is to persuade consumers to attach a positive value to the green good, therefore directing consumers' 1 The Italian guidelines are a joint e¤ort between the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Environment. For further details visit www.mit.gov.it/mit/site.php?p=cm&o=vd&id=2724. 2 Visit www.epa.gov/smartway/basic-info/index.htm for further details.
preferences towards that good. The main implication is an increase of its demand at the expense of the consumption of the brown good. This is captured by resorting to the theory of relative preferences, recently developed by Ghazzai (2008) and Alexopoulos and Sapp (2006) , inter alii. 3 Our main results are as follows. When consumer preferences favour hedonic quality, taxation prevails as the best policy instrument to achieve the highest level of social welfare. The environmental campaign is too costly, and it only indirectly a¤ects …rms'pro…ts. However, consumer surplus shrinks, as taxation reduces total output. On the contrary, when consumers value the environmental quality of the good, then an environmental campaign may be more e¢ cient than the pollution tax, provided that its cost is not excessive, and that the green expansive e¤ect generated by the campaign is su¢ ciently high. As we will explain in the paper, such an e¤ect positively depends on the average willingness to pay for the environmental quality. However, if the campaign exceeds a certain level of cost, then taxation is preferred. We will also highlight the ambiguous role of the environmental emission parameter: a relatively high emission level can favour the adoption of the campaign if its cost is contained, otherwise the opposite may occur.
The main message of our contribution can therefore be summarized as follows. An environmental campaign based on relative preferences is less e¢ cient than a traditional taxation instrument, as long as consumers are environmentally unconcerned. Things change however with green consumerism, in which case the environmental campaign can be welfare improving with respect to environmental taxation. Our model can thus provide valuable environmental policy indications, depending on region-speci…c consumers preferences.
As recent studies have shown, environmental concern varies across countries as well as over time due to socio-economic conditions. Kahn and Kotchen (2010) point out that in the last few years the US has experienced substantial erosion in public concern about environmental issues because of the chilling e¤ect of recession. Based on national surveys, they have found a correlation between the unemployment rate and the relevance of global warming. Another example is provided by an European survey conducted between April and May 2011 on citizens'attitude towards the environment (Special Eurobarometer 365). 4 The result showed that most EU citizens feel that protecting the environment is important to them and that environmental problems have a direct impact on their everyday lives. Moreover, they are inclined also to play a part in protecting the environment and they consider that actions to protect the environment should be carried out at a European level.
These two studies suggest therefore that di¤erent levels of environmental concern may depend on socio-economic conditions as well as government engagement.
Literature review
Our paper is related to the literature on optimal tax policy with environmental quality. Among 3 Since the seminal work of Leibenstein (1950) , economists have aknowledged the importance of social factors in consumption decisions. Akerlof (1997) has showed that consumer satisfaction increases in proportion to the di¤erence between social classes. 4 should encourage and implement structural change of the economy changing the demand structure.
They claim that preferences shape the …nal demand and hence the CO 2 emissions of the economy.
These papers thus support environmental campaign as a policy instrument to supplement and/or substitute traditional environmental policies. In our paper, we contribute by assessing the e¢ ciency of such policies depending on consumers'environmental concern.
Last but not least, our theoretical conclusions are somewhat in line with Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2009). Here the authors consider a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly with heterogenous consumers where the quality choice of the …rms captures simultaneously their degree of corporate social responsibility and their environmental quality. They study the e¤ects of an increase in consumers' willingness to pay, which represents a higher social consciousness on the market equilibrium. Their main result is that shifting towards socially responsible consumer preferences is in most cases welfareimproving. However, it can be welfare-reducing when such an increase changes the market structure.
Hence, they obtain ambiguous conclusions about the e¢ ciency of environmental campaigns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the case with hedonic qualities, while Section 3 deals with environmental qualities. Section 4 summarizes our main results and discusses the assumptions of our model. Section 5 provides our concluding remarks.
Hedonic qualities
Consider two goods of di¤erent qualities: good H produced by …rm H is the high quality good, while good L produced by …rm L is the low quality good. These goods are vertically di¤erentiated in the traditional sense. Consumers agree that good H has a higher intrinsic quality than good L.
According to the de…nition of vertical di¤erentiation, they would all buy good H if they were sold at the same price. We assume that there is a continuum of consumers indexed by which is uniformly In this initial scenario consumers are environmentally unconcerned. The high quality good has a higher performance than the low quality good but it emits pollution. It represents therefore the brown good. The low quality good is emission-free and it is therefore considered as a green good. Pollution creates an environmental damage D that reduces social welfare. Such a damage is proportional to the emission released by the brown …rm: D = e x H , where x H is the quantity produced by …rm H.
Parameter e > 0 captures the marginal social cost associated to pollution. The government has two alternative policy instruments at its disposal: either a tax t proportional to the polluting emission, or a campaign designed to raise environmental awareness.
We develop the following two-stage game: …rst, the policy maker decides whether to intervene and which policy instrument to use to reduce the environmental damage for any given level of the per-unit emissions; second, …rms compete in prices. We solve the game by backward induction.
More precisely, in the following, we solve the price competition stage for the two cases (taxation and campaign) and then make the proper comparison to solve the policy maker decision.
Taxing the polluting good
Consumer of type 2 [0; b] has the following utility:
q H p H , if she buys the high quality good, q L p L , if she buys the low quality good, 0, if she refrains from buying.
The hedonic qualities of the two goods are indicated by q H > q L ; p H and p L denotes the prices of the high and the low quality goods, respectively. Parameter measures the consumer's willingness to pay for hedonic quality. Notice that the above utility function does not account for the presence of pollution. As usual, the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and not buying at all is:
The consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and the high quality good is instead:
L and x H = b H . 5 As for the cost speci…cation, we assume that producing the green good requires a constant marginal cost c > 0, whereas the brown quality is produced at zero cost. Nonetheless, the polluting good is subject to a per-unit tax t. Thus, t can be interpreted as the tax di¤erential between the two …rms, while c represents the marginal production cost di¤erential. 6 Pro…t functions are therefore given by:
Proceeding by backward induction, we solve the price competition stage and derive the main results, which are valid for each quality con…guration. 7 Using F.O.C.s, equilibrium prices as a function of qualities are:
Let us now de…ne:
5 Note that at equilibrium the market is always uncovered because the consumer of type = 0 always gets a non-positive utility from buying either good. 6 One can also interpret the decision to produce the green good as a way to avoid the environmental taxation. 7 We will not explicitly solve the quality competition stage, as our focus is on comparing a new policy tool like the campaign with the traditional tax instrument.
Lemma 1 Both …rms are active in the market i¤ b > b min and t < t max .
Proof. See Appendix.
We assume that the conditions reported in Lemma 1 hold throughout the section. They indicate that a su¢ ciently large consumers'heterogeneity together with a non excessive taxation are required for both …rms to coexist in the market. We limit our attention to such a case as we want to reproduce a concrete situation where polluting …rms compete in the market with non-polluting ones. Moreover, it is usually in the best interest of the society to have the highest number of …rms, and this will be also con…rmed by the model. Equilibrium demands/outputs are:
shrinks total output, thus implying that consumer surplus decreases when the government applies such a tool. This trade-o¤ between output provision and environmental protection represents one of the point of interest of our analysis. 8 Equilibrium pro…ts are given by:
Social welfare as a function of t writes in a compact form as:
The precise expression of CS L and CS H are reported in the Appendix (See Proof of Proposition 1).
Algebraic calculations reveal that SW (t) is concave in t. We can therefore compute the optimal tax rate which maximizes social welfare:
Taking into account that t has to be non-negative, and that the conditions appearing in Lemma 1 have to be satis…ed:
Lemma 2 t 2 [0; t max ) when e 2 [e t min ; e t max ).
For very low values of e, the optimal tax is zero because the negative e¤ect on output is higher than the positive e¤ect induced by the reduction in the emission level. 9 On the contrary, for very high values of the polluting emission, the optimal tax is t max . In such a case, the pro…t of the high quality …rm tends to zero. It is relatively easy to demonstrate that the government would prefer to leave an " ! 0 to the polluting …rm, and then still have a duopoly, instead of pushing it out from the market. The previous discussion is summarized into:
Remark 1 Depending on the value associated to the environmental damage e, the government optimally sets: (i) t = 0 when e < e t min ; (ii) t = t when e 2 [e t min ; e t max ); (iii) t = t max when e > e t max .
Depending on the emission level, we …nd therefore three di¤erent values of t which should be inserted in the social welfare function (3). These equilibrium values, as well as those associated to the optimal environmental campaign, are reported in the Appendix (see again the Proof of Proposition 1).
Supporting the environmental campaign
Assume that the policy maker implements a campaign to inform consumers about the damaging emission released by good H. As introduced before, the campaign that we have in mind aims at creating a social stigma against the consumption of the polluting (brown) good. This should encourage consumers to increase the consumption of the green good at the expense of the brown one.
This generates a green expansive e¤ect, as it will be labelled in the paper.
Formally, a new term appears in the indirect utility, namely > 0, which multiplies the quality gap: 10
, if she buys the low quality good, 0, if she refrains from buying.
The consumer indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and not buying at all is:
9 Although mathematically correct, we disregard the case in which the government o¤ers a subsidy (negative t) to help the polluting …rm.
1 0 An alternative, and probably more costly campaign should inform consumers about the emission level. This could be represented by:
qH pH e qL pL + e:
Notice that in such a scenario represents the level of accuracy of the information provided. One can think of 2 (0; 1) as a measure of such accuracy. However, such a formulation increases the di¢ culty of the mathematical expressions without changing the main message.
The consumer indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and the high quality good is:
Note that, given prices, the market share of L increases in . The consumer that is indi¤erent between not buying at all and buying the low quality ( L ) moves to the left, while the one indi¤erent between buying the low quality and the high quality ( H ) moves to the right. Contrary to the previous case, the market (hypothetically) can be covered. Consumer of type = 0 can have a positive utility
However, we can show that this is not compatible with the basic assumptions of the model, in particular that p H > p L . 11 We focus therefore on the uncovered market situation.
Demands are formally written as before:
H , yet the indi¤erent consumers are a¤ected by , as represented in (6) and (5). Producing the low quality (green) good still requires a per-unit cost c > 0, while the high quality (brown) is produced at zero cost. Pro…t functions are expressed as:
As there is no per-unit tax levied on the brown good, pollution is indirectly fought through the e¤ect of the campaign on consumers'preferences. Equilibrium prices can easily be obtained:
The following condition is compatible with the basic assumptions of the model:
Lemma 3 Provided b > b min , both …rms stay in the market i¤ b > b min and
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equilibrium variables are then:
By construction, we …nd that @x L =@ > 0 and @x H =@ > 0 < 0, as expected. However, di¤erently from before, total output increases in . Consumer surplus tends therefore to be higher than in the previous case, thus solving the trade-o¤ between total output (that determines the degree of market competition) and total emissions (that determines the degree of environmental protection) that we highlighted with the taxation instrument.
The social welfare function writes in a compact way as :
where the precise expressions of CS L + CS H are con…ned to the Appendix (see Proof of Proposition 1). Di¤erently from the taxation case, the social welfare is concave in the policy instrument only for su¢ ciently high values of the marginal cost of the campaign. In particular, this requires:
We assume that s > s min . This accounts for the fact that it becomes increasingly di¢ cult to convince consumers to buy the green good. We compute the optimal level which maximizes social welfare:
Taking into account that 0 and that the conditions from Lemma 4 have to be satis…ed, we …nd:
Proof. See the Appendix, where one can also …nd the precise values of e min and e max .
The optimal policy is = 0 as long as the emission level is very low because the cost of the campaign does not compensate the positive e¤ect linked to the emission reduction. In contrast, for very high values of the emission, the optimal policy is = max . In such a case, the pro…t of the high quality …rm are still positive (note that for = max the demand for the high quality good is still positive). The previous discussion is summarized into:
Remark 2 Depending on the value taken by the polluting emission e, the government optimally sets: (i) = 0 when e < e min ; (ii) = when e 2 [e min ; e max ); (iii) = max when e > e t max .
Comparing the two instruments under hedonic qualities
We now compare the two policy instruments: taxation versus campaign. First of all, we need to rank the threshold values of e that indicate the regions where di¤erent levels of social welfare occur.
The ranking depends on the combination between the average hedonic quality b and the cost of the campaign s. In the Appendix we detail all the possible cases and perform the relative comparisons.
The following proposition summarizes the most important result:
Proposition 1 Assume that consumers are not environmentally concerned (hedonic preferences).
The social welfare preferences are such that, if the cost of the environmental campaign is su¢ ciently high (s > s min ), then the tax instrument is always preferred to the environmental campaign.
When the social welfare associated to the environmental campaign is concave, the government always prefers the taxation instrument. Under the assumptions of our model, taxation can also completely eliminate the high quality …rm H (or leave it with zero pro…t), while the environmental campaign entails a high cost s which makes such an e¤ort undesirable. These social preferences are mainly due the fact that the conditions for the uncovered market that we analyze imply that cannot be too high. This is to assume that the campaign is not "revolutionary", that is not so e¤ective to induce all consumers (also the more H oriented consumer) to switch to the green good.
We believe that such an assumption is realistic as it captures a situation in which at least a part of the population would not change its consumption behaviour after the campaign. 12 Results change if we consider relatively low costs associated to the environmental campaign. We discuss in Section 4 this issue.
Environmental qualities
We next consider the case in which consumers value the environmental quality. Formally now measures the environmental quality rather then the hedonic quality. We assume that consumers consider as low quality good the one that pollutes (brown good), whereas the high quality good is the green one, which has zero emissions. The environmental damage is then D = e x L . Note that parameter b > 0, again, measures consumers' heterogeneity but di¤erently from the previous scenario, it now measures the average valuation of the environmental quality in the market. Thus, we can state that the higher is b the more the average consumer cares about the environment.
As before, the government may intervene through a traditional taxation of the polluting good or through a campaign that augments consumers'environmental sensitivity by introducing relative preferences. Accordingly, we develop the following two-stage game that we solve by backward induction: …rst, the policy maker decides whether to intervene and which policy instrument to use to reduce the environmental damage; second, …rms compete in prices.
Taxing the polluting good
q H p H , if she buys the high (green) quality good, q L p L , if she buys the low (brown) quality good, 0, if she refrains from buying.
where q H > q L indicates the environmental qualities of the two goods and thus measures consumers'
willingness to pay for environmental quality. The consumer indi¤erent between buying the brown quality good and not buying at all is:
The consumer indi¤erent between buying the brown quality good and the green quality good is:
Demands are given again by x L = H L and x H = b H . As before, producing the green quality good requires a constant marginal cost c > 0, while the brown quality good is assumed to be produced at zero cost. However, this good is subject to a per-unit tax t which represents the tax di¤erential between the two …rms. On the other hand, c represents the marginal production cost di¤erential.
Pro…t functions are therefore:
Proceeding by backward induction, we solve the price competition stage and derive the main results, which are valid for each quality con…guration. Equilibrium prices are:
Additional superscript E indicates that we are considering environmental preferences. This will be used throughout this section to di¤erentiate from the hedonic preferences scenario that has been considered in the previous section.
If p H > p L , both demands are positive. If instead p H p L , the demand for the low quality good is zero:
. We consider the case in which both …rms stay in the market.
This requires the conditions provided in the following lemma to hold. De…ne:
Lemma 5 Both …rms stay in the market i¤ b > b E min and t < t E max .
Equilibrium demands/outputs are:
Following the assumption of environmental qualities, we can observe that @x E L =@t < 0 and @x E H =@t > 0. Moreover, notice that @(x E H + x E L )=@t < 0: total output decreases with t. Equilibrium pro…ts are given by:
They are expressed in the same way as with hedonic preferences, but obviously with di¤erent equilibrium quantities.
where the value of CS E L + CS E H is reported in the Appendix (see Proof of Proposition 2). Algebraic calculations show that the social welfare function is still concave in t. The optimal tax rate can be found as follows:
Taking into account that t E has to be non-negative, and that the conditions from Lemma 5 have to be satis…ed:
when e 2 [max 0; e tE min ; e tE max ).
Proof. From (13) ,
, with e tE max > e tE min .
We summarize the optimal tax policy in the following remark.
Remark 3 Depending on the value taken by the polluting emission e, the government optimally
Notice that when t = t E max , the pro…t of the low quality …rm tends to zero. Using the same reasoning as in the previous case, it is relatively easy to prove that the government would prefer to leave an " ! 0 to the polluting …rm, and then keep the duopoly, instead of pushing the …rm out of the market. The expressions for the social welfare for the three di¤erent values of t which appear in Remark 3 are in the Appendix (see Proof of Proposition 2).
Supporting the environmental campaign
Assume that the policy maker implements a campaign that creates a social stigma for brown L consumers while at the same time praising green H consumers. The utility from buying is then as follows:
(q H q L ) if she buys the brown good, 0 if she refrains from buying.
13
Notice that for given prices, relative preferences are such that the market share of H increases in , as the consumer who is indi¤erent between not buying and buying L ( L ) moves to the right, while the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying L and H ( H ) moves to the left.
Following the previous discussion, the demands for the goods are therefore given by x L = H L and x H = b H . Again, we assume that producing the green good implies higher costs than the brown good (c > 0).
The market is uncovered and both …rms stay in the market i¤ b > b E min and
As before, notice that x L decreases with , while x H increases with . However, overall total output now decreases with , meaning that the environmental campaign is not a priori increasing consumer surplus.
Equilibrium pro…ts are now given by:
where s is the marginal cost of the campaign. The social welfare function is concave in if and only if s > s min , where s min is de…ned in (8) . In this case it is possible to compute the optimal level of that maximizes social welfare:
Taking into account that E has to be non-negative and that the the conditions reported in Lemma 7 have to be satis…ed, we …nd:
We summarize the optimal environmental policy in the following remark.
Remark 4
Depending on the value taken by the polluting emission e, the government optimally
The threshold value e b can be found in the Appendix (Proof of Proposition 8), as well as the complete expression for the social welfare in the three cases reported in Remark 4 (again in the Proof of Proposition 2). We can now compare the two scenarios to …nd out which policy instrument should be adopted by the government.
Comparing the two instruments under environmental qualities
As in the previous scenario, we need to rank the threshold values of e that de…ne the regions where di¤erent levels of social welfare occur. The ranking depends on parameters b and s. In the Appendix we detail all the possible cases. The following proposition summarizes the most important results.
Let
Proposition 2 Assume that consumers are environmentally concerned. The social welfare preferences are such that: Proof. See the Appendix.
The results coming from the above proposition reveal that an indirect instrument as the environmental campaign can be more e¢ cient than a direct tax levied on the brown good. The two preconditions for that to happen is that the cost of the campaign be not too excessive, and that the average evaluation of the environmental quality in the market be su¢ ciently high. While the …rst precondition is trivial, the second one is less obvious. In particular, it highlights that the green expansive e¤ect of the environmental campaign increases in b: the higher the average evaluation for the environmental quality in the market, the larger the number of consumers willing to buy the green good. Such an e¤ect implies that, for a given cost s, an increase in b increases the e¤ectiveness of the campaign in reducing the polluting emissions.
Therefore, for low values of b, the green expansive e¤ect is almost irrelevant, and taxing the polluting product is preferred from the social standpoint. In contrast, for high values of b, then such an e¤ect becomes crucial and the campaign turns out to be more e¢ cient than the taxation instrument, provided its cost is not exaggerated.
Finally, when b 2 (b 1 ; b 2 ), the green expansion e¤ect is intermediate and the comparison between the two instruments includes more elements which can either tend to reinforce or to sti ‡e the relevancy of such an e¤ect. Again, taxation prevails in terms of e¢ ciency when s is high. On the contrary, when the campaign is relatively a¤ordable, we …nd that the quality ratio q H =q L may compensate for b. In particular, when q H =q L is su¢ ciently high, meaning that the brown good is very distant from the green good in terms of the quality perceived by environmentally concerned consumers, then the campaign can be welfare improving as compared to the tax instrument, especially if the polluting damage is severe (i.e. if e exceeds a certain value). The explanation relies on the fact that a relatively inexpensive campaign can reduce the consumption of a good whose (environmental) quality is very low, and this is even more important when the external emission released by such good is very polluting.
Moreover, it is worth noticing that a relatively high emission level e can determine a preference for the taxation instrument, when the campaign is su¢ ciently costly. The role of e is therefore ambiguous:
Corollary 1 When b b 1 , a high emission level may favor the adoption of the campaign if its cost is low, while it may induce the social planner to tax the polluting good if the cost of the campaign is high.
Hence, depending on the cost of the campaign, a high emission level can determine whether the policy maker should adopt the environmental campaign or the taxation instrument. When b 2 (b 1 ; b 2 ) taxation is usually preferred given that consumers' heterogeneity is limited. However, when the quality ratio is very high, the brown good is perceived of very poor quality: a high emission level may then convince the policy maker to implement the campaign instead of taxing the polluting good, provided the cost of the campaign is not excessive. On the contrary, when b b 2 , if the campaign is costly, then taxation prevails when pollution increases.
A tale of two worlds
The purpose of our paper was to examine social welfare under two di¤erent policy instruments, both aiming at reducing pollution emissions, in two di¤erent "worlds", one populated by environmentally conscious citizens, while the other by those indi¤erent to environmental issues.
The main conclusion that one can draw when comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2 is that consumers'preliminary sensitivity towards the environment is a necessary condition for the environmental campaign to prove more e¢ cient than the pollution tax. Remember that we evaluate the relative performance of the two instruments on the basis of total social welfare. In both our "worlds", the environmental campaign is indeed e¤ective in reducing the pollution emissions. Indeed, it shifts the buying decision of (at least) some consumers from the brown to the green good, independently of consumers' concern about the environment. However, when compared to other instruments like the pollution tax, the campaign may not be the welfare maximizing policy when the environmental concern is low.
In our model, in fact, such a preliminary concern a¤ects the same de…nition of quality. When consumers are environmentally indi¤erent, for example, they tend to measure the quality in terms of the intrinsic performance of a product. The green expansive e¤ect generated by the campaign is therefore weak, and it does not compensate for the cost required to support the campaign itself. A traditional instrument like the pollution tax, which is directly levied on the production of the polluting good, turns out to be more e¢ cient. In addition, it represents a net gain for the government. For the environmental campaign to be also socially e¢ cient, we need a scenario in which the market evaluation of the environmental quality is su¢ ciently high.
In real world terms, this translates into di¤erent environmental policies adopted in di¤erent countries.
Extreme examples of what we have in mind are provided by Sweden and China. While the former is an early adopter of sustainable thinking and one of the few industrialized countries to have reduced its carbon emissions, 13 the latter may well represent an example of a country where environmental protection is not a main concern. Empirical support for our statement comes from the Eurostat statistics on EU countries'tax revenues on pollution as a percentage of GDP: in 2011 the EU average was 0.11, while Sweden was well below this value (0.05). 14 China, on the contrary, su¤ers from severe environmental damages to natural resources associated with the country's rapid economic successes. 15 Recent measures taken by the Chinese government aims at improving its environmental situation. However, this is mainly done by resorting to traditional policy instruments. 16 We would like to point out that our policy implications are based on total social welfare as a measure of a social well-being. While this is a quite standard measure of welfare, a policy maker may decide to put di¤erent weights on consumer and producer surplus when evaluating a policy intervention. Our results may therefore change if we consider consumer surplus as an alternative measure of welfare. Indeed, as put forward in the model, taxation shrinks total output, thus implying that consumer surplus decreases when the government applies such a tool. This holds under both hedonic and environmental preferences. As for the environmental campaign, it has a similar e¤ect but only with environmental preferences. Under hedonic preferences, on the contrary, the e¤ect of the campaign is to increase total output, thus expanding consumer surplus. This means that if one attaches a relatively high weight to consumer surplus, then the environmental campaign may surpass the taxation instrument in terms of e¢ ciency even if consumers are environmentally unconcerned.
Discussion on the assumptions
It is worth discussing the main technical assumptions of our model in order to check the robustness of our results. The …rst assumption is related to the existence of two "worlds"; one characterized by hedonic preferences and the other by environmental preferences. We acknowledge that this implies two polarized scenarios, and that in any society we …nd environmentally concerned consumers together with unconcerned one. Hence, usually these two "worlds" coexist in the same city, country, and region. However, the separation that we adopt in our theoretical representation is crucial to understand which policy is socially preferable among these di¤erent consumers. Clearly, there exists a continuum of intermediate scenarios where, for instance, a fraction of consumers is environmentally unconcerned, whereas the complementary fraction (1 ) is environmentally concerned. We believe, that, while this may represent an interesting extension of our modeling strategy, it would not add much to our point. Our guess is that there would be an threshold such that the campaign would prove to be more e¢ cient than the tax instrument as long as the fraction of environmentally concerned consumers is su¢ ciently high (and viceversa).
Secondly, we assume that the cost of the environmental campaign is su¢ ciently high (s > s min ):
this ensures that the social welfare function is concave in the environmental campaign ( ). This allows us to …nd, for intermediate emission levels, the optimal level of the environmental campaign.
For s < s min , the social welfare function is convex in , meaning that the optimal campaign level is reached either in = 0 or in = max . Considering hedonic preferences, it is possible to demonstrate that, when s < s min , there are conditions for which a relatively cheaper campaign can be more more e¢ cient than the pollution tax. In particular, this is more likely to happen for relatively high values of parameter b, i.e. when consumers'ex-ante heterogeneity is prominent. However, as both goods are still on the market, the emission level should not be perceived as too dangerous by the social planner, otherwise a more direct taxation instrument is to be preferred. 17 In contrast, in the environmental preferences scenario our qualitative results do not change, and the campaign is, a fortiori, more e¢ cient than the tax instrument in most cases.
Thirdly, notice that we restrict our attention to su¢ ciently low levels of the environmental campaign: this assumption ensures that both …rms stay in the market and that the initial quality ranking does not reverse. In particular, in the environmental preferences scenario, the threshold value of ( max ) is such that, beyond this value, the low (brown) quality …rm would be inactive in the market.
In contrast, in the hedonic preferences scenario, the threshold value of ( max ) is such that, again beyond this value, the low (green) quality …rm would become the high quality one. That is, we would observe, due to the e¤ect of the campaign, a switch in the hedonic qualities. 18 In other words, in order to keep the initial hedonic qualities'ranking, we assume that the campaign cannot be too "revolutionary". Notice, however, that our results are robust to this assumption. Indeed, in the environmental preferences scenario, it would not make sense to further pursue the campaign. Once the brown …rm is pushed o¤ the market, then the emissions reach their minimal level. On the other hand, in the hedonic preferences scenario, extending the analysis to comprehend higher levels of would alter the equilibrium market structure. In particular, this would imply passing …rst from an uncovered to a covered duopoly market (at the limit), and then to a monopoly dominated by the low green quality …rm. Yet again, our main result would hold. For environmentally unconcerned consumers, the tax instrument would remain more e¢ cient than the campaign. In fact, recall that pursuing high levels of the environmental campaign would require increasing costs.
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered two di¤erent worlds, depending on whether consumers'preferences are ex ante a¤ected by environmental concerns or not. The …rst world deals with consumers who value only the intrinsic quality of the good. The second one is instead characterized by consumers who appreciate the environmental sustainability more than the pure performance of the purchased good . The automotive industry, for instance, provides various case studies in support of the two di¤erent theoretical scenarios that we represented. Consumers, in fact, tend to have di¤erent valuations regarding the performance of the vehicle as compared its environmental impact.
In both cases, we have studied the adoption of two di¤erent policies by the social planner/government.
The conventional tax on the emission of pollution has been compared with an environmental cam-paign which aimed at stigmatizing the polluting (brown) good. By design, both policy instruments are e¤ective in reducing the polluting emissions. However, their e¢ ciency from a social welfare point of view changes accordingly to consumer environmental concern. More precisely, in case of environmentally unconcerned consumers, the tax instrument reveals to be more e¢ cient than the environmental campaign, whereas the opposite may occur when consumers value the environmental quality of the goods.
In the previous section, we have also discussed the robustness of the main assumptions of our model, together with its main limitations. Nonetheless, we believe that our paper may represent an interesting starting point in order to evaluate the relative performance of environmental campaign vis à vis traditional policy instruments. Moreover, additional theoretical and empirical research must be carried out with the aim of providing accurate results, thereby helping the policy maker in the design of the best suited instrument for social welfare in order to curb pollution emission.
On the theoretical ground, an interesting extension of our research concerns the potential dynamic e¢ ciency of the campaign itself. Consider, for instance, an initial scenario where consumers are characterized by hedonic preferences. Although environmental campaigns may not pay o¤ in the short term, they may gradually become ingrained in the social consciousness, thereby providing a foundation for the success of future campaigns. Thus, we should compare the static e¢ ciency of the tax instrument with the dynamic e¢ ciency of the environmental campaign. Related to this issue, we may also think of using dynamic models to capture the idea that the cost of the campaign could decrease over time.
t > t min . This reduces the number of cases to be examined, without losing economic intuition. By combining the previous conditions, it follows that condition b > b min combined with t < t max are required to have both players active in an uncovered market.
Proof of Lemma 3
To start with, notice that
This threshold value of decreases in c and increases in b. On the one hand, the higher c is, the lower the value which guarantees that both goods are in the market, that is the more stringent the constraint because p L becomes increasingly higher than p H . On the other hand, the higher parameter b is, the higher the threshold for for both goods to stay in the market, that is the less binding the constraint because consumers become increasingly heterogeneous and competition softens. 19 We have to check whether at the equilibrium prices both …rms are in the market, i.e. we need to verify that 0 < L < H < b:
Assuming that b > b min , we need therefore only to compare the two threshold values of . This comparison depends on b. However, as we will demonstrate that exactly the same results appear when using one of the two values, we can use max = min
Proof of Lemma 4
From (9),
. 1 9 If is high relative to b or b is low relative to the high quality good goes out of the market: even the highest quality oriented consumer (which is b) will buy the low quality green good. The same hold when b is low relative to , in fact the higher b the more heterogeneous are consumers and so the more di¢ cult that the market is served by only one quality.
Proof of Proposition 1
First of all, when taxing the polluting good, remember that the social welfare function appears in (3), where:
The optimal tax rate t which maximizes social welfare appears in (4), and from Lemma 1 we know that t 2 [0; t max ) when e 2 [e t min ; e t max ). Hence, as reported in Remark 1, the government sets: (i) t = 0 when e < e t min ; (ii) t = t when e 2 [e t min ; e t max ); (iii) t = t max when e > e t max . By substituting into (3), we have:
Second, when activating the campaign, the social welfare function as a function of is given by (7) , where:
The optimal appears in (9); by combining the results in Lemma 4 with the considerations reported in Remark 2, we obtain that, by substituting into (7):
SW j =0 = SW j t=0 by construction,
For exposition purposes, we limit our attention to the case when max = 1 max . However, tedious numerical calculations show that the same results would hold even when considering max = 2 max .
Now we can prove the main results of Proposition 1. When s > s min , by comparing the di¤erent e-thresholds one can …nd the following three cases.
When b 2 (b min ; e b), with b min de…ned in (1) and
the ranking is as follows: e t min < e t max < e min < e max :
When b > e b and s 2 (s min ; e s), with s min de…ned in (8) and
the ranking is: e t min < e min < e max < e t max :
Finally, for b > e b and s > e s, we have that: e t min < e min < e t max < e max :
Comparing the appropriate social welfare expressions, we can prove that, for any emission level e, taxation always determines a higher welfare than the environmental campaign. In order to provide a sketch of the proof, let us start from the …rst interval region, in which b 2 (b min ; e b): Four subintervals have to considered, depending on the emission level: 20 1. For e 2 e t min ; e t max , we compare SW j =0 with SW j t=t ; the result is SW j =0 SW j t=t < 0:
2. For e 2 e t max ; e min , SW j =0 SW j t=tmax < 0.
3. In e 2 (e min , e max ); by evaluating SW j = vis à vis SW j t=t we …nd SW j = SW j t=tmax < 0.
4. Finally, also in e > e max the taxation instrument prevails, as SW j = max SW j t=tmax < 0.
The precise expressions of the welfare comparisons are very long and are not reported in the text.
They are available upon request with the list of the several numerical simulations that have been run to verify our results.
Similar results can be obtained when b > e b and s 2 (s min ; e s); we do not replicate all the welfare comparisons. However, the result is immediate to explain given that, ceteribus paribus, we are increasing the parameter b which measures the average valuation of the hedonic quality in the market.
Given that consumers attach even more importance to the vertical hedonic quality, a campaign that tries to make them aware of the environmental damage is less likely to function, and then taxation is even more e¢ cient. Finally, in b > e b and s > e s, the cost of the campaign is higher than in the previous interval regions, and therefore, a fortiori, this kind of policy is deemed to fail when compared to taxation.
Proof of Lemma 5
We focus on the case in which the price of the high quality good is higher than that of the low quality:
Moreover, we have to guarantee that at these equilibrium prices both …rms stay in the market. This implies that we have to simultaneously satisfy conditions 0
However, it is easy to show that t E
Proof of Lemma 7
To start with, notice that:
max increases in c and in b. Next, we have to check whether at the equilibrium prices both …rms are in the market, i.e. we need to verify that 0 < L < H < b:
Therefore, assuming that b > b E min implies that E min is negative and so H < b always holds.
Proof of Lemma 8
Consider (15). First:
, with e b > b E min . It follows that E > 0 always when b > e b, and when b 2 (b E min ; e b) if e > e E min . Second:
Proof of Proposition 2
The expression for the social welfare function when the government decides to levy a tax on the polluting …rm is (12) , where:
Combining the results of Lemma 6 and Remark 3, by substituting into (12), we have:
When the campaign is adopted, social welfare as a function of is given by (14) , where:
Lemma 8 and Remark 4 indicate that, by substituting into (14), we have:
We can now prove the main results which appear in Proposition 2. Consider only the case where we have internal solutions, i.e. we focus on the case where s > s min . By comparing the di¤erent e-thresholds one can …nd the four relevant cases. For each case, we perform the welfare comparisons. 21 (i) When b 2 b E min ; b 1 , with b E min de…ned in (1) and
, the ranking is as follows: For each subinterval we compare the relevant social welfare:
